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Private Philanthropy or Policy Transfer?   
The Transnational Norms of the Open Society Institute  
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The Open Society Institute (OSI) is a private operating and grant-making foundation 
that serves as the hub of the Soros foundations network, a group of autonomous 
national foundations around the world.  OSI is a mechanism for the international 
diffusion of expertise and ‘best practices’ to post communist countries and other 
democratizing nations. Focusing on the ‘soft’ ideational and normative policy transfer 
the paper highlights the engagement in governance that comes with OSI transnational 
policy partnerships.    
 
 
World count: 7,830 
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Introduction 
 
Founded in 1993 by the billionaire philanthropist George Soros, the Open Society 
Institute (OSI) is a private operating and grant-making foundation that serves as the 
hub of the Soros foundations network, a group of autonomous foundations and 
organizations in more than 60 countries. OSI and the network implement a range of 
initiatives to promote open societies, seeking to shape national and international 
policies with knowledge and expertise. This paper evaluates its roles and activities as 
a transnational policy actor through the analytical lens of policy transfer and norm 
brokerage.   
 
OSI transfers expertise and ‘best practices’ to transition countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet Union (fSU). The ‘open society’ 
discourses of transition and reform is multi-faceted. On a local level, OSI implements 
a range of initiatives to support the rule of law, education, public health, and 
independent media. Simultaneously, OSI works to build alliances across borders and 
continents on issues such as combating corruption and rights abuses.  The idea is to 
give ‘voice’ to communities, and emerging policy elites, in transition countries 
through capacity building, the spread of ‘best practices’ and country-specific 
translation of ‘open society’ values.  
The discussion draws upon the literatures of policy transfer and  diffusion (Levi Faur, 
2005; Simmons, Dobbin & Garret, 2006; Stubbs, 2005). The objective is to widen our 
understanding on two fronts:  
 
First, to broaden awareness of the domains where policy transfer occurs from its 
horizontal intergovernmental focus to vertical supra-national policy venues. This 
paper is distinctive from public policy and international relations analyses operating 
within a frame of methodological nationalism that explain norm diffusion in terms of 
its impacts only upon domestic politics (Checkel, 1997). The focus here is on a 
transnational philanthropic actor seeking to inform and give shape to the domains of 
global and regional governance. This accords with the notion that non-state actors 
represent a new logic of governmentality (Sending & Neumann, 2006). Non-state 
involvement, specifically transnational philanthropy, in certain fields of policy 
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making promotes the ‘transnationalization of policy’. National and sub-national 
venues of policy making are not displaced but become inter-connected with policy 
actors in international organizations and multilateral initiatives.  
 
Second, the aim is to extend the range of who engages in policy transfer to include 
transnational non-state actors such as OSI and the various academics, specialists and 
consultants engaged by OSI. Transnational policy communities of experts and 
professionals share their expertise and information and form common patterns of 
understanding regarding policy through regular interaction via international 
conferences, government delegations and sustained e-communication (Bennett, 1991: 
224-25); that is, an international policy culture.  Addressing the role of international 
actors in transferring policy and diffusing knowledge, a dynamic for the 
transnationalization of policy comes into analytical sight. In particular, ‘soft’ forms of 
transfer – such as the spread of norms and expertise in which non-state actors play a 
more prominent role – complements the hard transfer of policy tools, laws and 
practices pursued by government agencies and international organizations.  
 
As a diffuser of policy ideas, the legitimacy of OSI’s expertise is drawn through a 
circular process.  That is, between the knowledge it produces and the audiences that 
help legitimize and institutionally consolidate that knowledge.  It becomes a mutual 
validation process, but one that gives intellectual credibility to OSI norm advocacy 
and policy transfer. This credibility construction so as to inform policy deeply 
implicates OSI in global governance.  Accordingly, this paper disputes orthodox 
views of civil society as a ‘third sector’ separate from state and market drawing 
attention to the manner in which a philanthropic actor has sought privileged access 
into policy domains and debates. 
 
Research for this paper was based on a combination of methods. First, extensive 
information was drawn from its web-site, annual reports and other policy publications. 
Second, participation-observation formed the core component of research. This 
involved collaboration with OSI colleagues during a two-year appointment at Central 
European University (CEU) from 2004 onwards. CEU shared offices with OSI.  
Third, interviews with OSI staff in New York, Washington DC and London were 
undertaken.  Interviewees were chosen on the basis of their management roles of OSI 
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Initiatives that involved transnational activity and also serve to counter-balance the 
CEE standpoint for participant observation. Finally, literature on philanthropy, some 
of it of a critical disposition towards OSI (eg Guilhot, 2007,; Roelofs, 2003; & Stubbs, 
2005) is combined with an international relations literature on civil society and 
transnational activism to provide the general analytical context. This is done to argue 
that the concept of global civil society becomes attractive as it can be used to justify 
institutions of global governance (Bartelson, 2006). The role of private philanthropy 
thereby becomes legitimated.  
 
The first section outlines the concept of policy transfer and philanthropy as non-state 
mechanism of transfer. The second section focuses the Open Society Institute as an 
organization and how it creates itself as an expert body. The third section outlines the 
norm brokerage and policy transfer activities of the OSI. The fourth section 
concentrates on the policy scholarship of OSI. The penultimate sections addresses 
OSI’s ‘global turn’ and ‘policy awakening’ while the conclusion returns to the theme 
of authority construction.  
 
1. Policy Transfer  
 
Policy transfer is a transnational policy process whereby knowledge about policies, 
administrative arrangements or institutions in one place is used in the development of 
policy elsewhere. The objects of transfer can include (i) policies, (ii) institutions, (iii) 
ideologies or justifications, (iv) attitudes and ideas, and (v) negative lessons 
(Dolowitz, 1997).  Additionally, there are different degrees of transfer in that actors 
engage in straight-forward copying of policy, legislation or techniques as well as 
various forms of emulation, synthesis and hybridization, and inspiration (Dolowitz & 
Marsh, 1996: 351).  
 
Policy and normative transfers can be either voluntary or coercive or combinations 
thereof. Terms such as ‘lesson-drawing’ portray transfer as a voluntary and somewhat 
rational activity. Other terms emphasize compulsory conformity; that is: ‘penetration’ 
by international policy actors (Bennett, 1991).  By contrast, the more atmospheric and 
apolitical term ‘diffusion’ has been used in World Bank circles (Stiglitz, 2000).  Some 
international relations scholars recognize the role of agency and the prospects for 
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individual and organizational learning. This literature leans towards methodological 
nationalism when it asserts that: “International policy diffusion occurs when 
government policy decisions in a given country are systematically conditioned by 
prior policy choices made in other countries” (Simmons, Dobbin, & Garrett, 2006). 
Assuredly, policy diffusion occurs between countries. However, this paper goes 
beyond this hypothesis of national interdependence to suggest policy transfer creates 
transnational policy spaces.  
 
The mechanisms of transfer are multiple. One mechanism is coercion such as 
exercised directly or indirectly by powerful nations or international organizations.  
The Bretton Woods institutions have long been accused of dispensing ‘one-size-fits-
all’ policies coercively imposed through loan conditionality (although the discourse is 
now “putting countries in the driving seat” – Stiglitz, 2000).  Coercion is not at the 
disposal of a non-state actor like OSI.  Instead, developing shared understandings and 
consensual knowledge via ‘international policy communities’ (Bennett, 1991) is the 
strategy of non-state actors.    
 
Nevertheless, non-state actors are better at the ‘soft transfer’ of broad policy ideas via 
transnational advocacy networks (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). That is, influencing public 
opinion and policy agendas as ‘norm brokers’ (Acharya, 2004).  Philanthropic 
capacity building, expert based organizations transfer knowledge, practice and people. 
In theory, bodies like the OSI have the institutional capacity to scan the international 
environment and undertake detailed evaluations of policy that will help prevent the 
simplistic, ad hoc copying of policy that leads to inappropriate transfer and policy 
failure. 
 
The non-governmental status of a philanthropic body is a major structural constraint 
to policy transfer. A philanthropic foundation cannot bring about policy transfer alone 
but is dependent on governments, international organizations and local communities 
to see policy ideas accepted and instituted.  Ideas can have the power of persuasion, 
but they need institutions and interests behind them. Accordingly, non-state actors are 
often to be found in partnership or coalition on either an ad hoc or more permanent 
basis with government departments and agencies, international organizations or with 
other non-state actors.  
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Globalization dynamics have provided new opportunities for foundation influence. 
There is a complex relationship between firstly, economic globalization, and 
secondly, the thickening of international rule of law and new forms of political 
authority as drivers of globalization. Civil society is a third ‘driver’ of globalization.  
These drivers are creating new transnational processes and networks of policy 
making. Rather than network density and diversity disrupting hierarchies, opening 
participation and dispersing power, networks can represent new constellations of 
privatized power. Instead of being civil society manifestations of bottom-up, non-
statist globalization, networks are viewed here as ‘mutually implicated’ in the affairs 
of states and international organization (Baker, 2002: 936; Sending and Neumann, 
2006). Civil society is therefore not a separate domain but a space for new 
“governmental rationality where political power operates through rather than on civil 
society “ (Sending & Neumann, 2006: 669).  
 
One neglected aspect of global civil society is the ‘elite’ forms of associational life. 
This includes a variety of groups with different modes of membership, networking 
and organization. This diversity can only be itemized here with a few examples:  
1. Foundations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation; the Ford 
Foundation or the Aga Khan Foundation that provide funding and 
resources to other civil society organizations; 
2. Policy Dialogue Groups such as the World Economic Forum in Davos 
which acts as a transnational convener of opinion leaders in government, 
business, academe and NGOs; 
3. Activist promotional groups such as Freedom House engaged in the 
advocacy of certain values and ideals.  
4. Business Associations such as the Trans Atlantic Business Dialogue or the 
Global Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS; 
5. Scientific associations and research groups; for instance, the Global 
Tobacco Research Network.  
These are professional bodies with substantial financial resources or patronage. (and 
sometimes interlock) They are aimed at influencing policy and engaged in 
transferring experts and policy ideas between countries and professional communities.  
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This global sphere of civil society is not only hierarchical, but exclusive; that is, more 
accessible to wealthy, westernized professionals and their agencies. It is characterized 
by intense competition for funds, donor patronage or political recognition where 
national public institutions no longer serve as the sole organizing center for policy. 
Instead, multi-level polycentric forms of public policy in which a plethora of 
institutions and networks negotiate within and between international organizations 
and private regimes have emerged as pragmatic responses in the absence of formal 
institutions of global governance (Stone, 2008; Levi-Faur, 2005). Examples include 
private regimes like Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers – ICANN 
or global standard setting agencies such as International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors alongside transnational policy communities working on issues such as 
anti-corruption. Non-state actors like OSI are players in these transnational policy 
spaces.   
 
2. OSI Philanthropy 
 
The Open Society Institute is: 
… a private operating and grantmaking foundation, (that) aims to 
shape public policy to promote democratic governance, human rights, 
and economic, legal, and social reform. On a local level, OSI 
implements a range of initiatives to support the rule of law, education, 
public health, and independent media. At the same time, OSI works to 
build alliances across borders and continents on issues such as 
combating corruption and rights abuses.1
 
 
Created in 1993, OSI has been built as an international network but it overlays and 
funds a series of national foundations that emerged from 1984 onwards. The network 
consists of national foundations in 29 countries, foundations in Kosovo and 
Montenegro, and three regional foundations, the Open Society Initiative for Southern 
Africa (OSISA), the Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA) and a third 
initiative for East Africa (see Appendix 1).  
                                                          
1   http://www.soros.org/about/overview 
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OSI headquarters are located in New York and provide administrative, financial, and 
technical support to the nationally based Soros foundations. OSI-New York also 
operates Initiatives, which address specific issues on a regional or network-wide basis 
internationally (see Appendix 1.).  The second main office is in Budapest. 
 
The Soros national foundations operate as autonomous organizations with a local 
board of directors and considerable independence in determining how to implement 
the ideals of the open society. Due to an ethos of localism and of budgetary control 
within national boards, “the Soros national foundations are often perceived in their 
host countries as being organizations of those countries” rather than subordinates of 
OSI-NY or subject to the personal whims of Soros (Carothers, 1999: 273). In 
addition, there have been gradual pressures on the national foundations to become 
more self sufficient and less reliant on OSI funds. To varying degrees, these 
foundations participate in Network wide activities coordinated from New York and 
Budapest.  This paper is primarily focused on the network wide activities and 
Initiatives as these are most transnational in design and holder greater potential for 
policy transfer.   
 
OSI is a multi-faceted organization. First and foremost, OSI is a philanthropic body as 
it funds the types of groups itemized earlier. But it is also actively engaged in local 
communities and international affairs as an ‘operating foundation’.  
 
Accordingly, a second feature is that parts of OSI operate as venues for policy 
dialogue.  For instance, think tank initiatives like the new European Council on 
Foreign Relations (ECFR) “promote a more integrated European foreign policy with 
open society values at its core”.2
 
  OSI managers contribute to numerous policy 
dialogues while Soros has been a regular speaker in Davos at the World Economic 
Forum. 
                                                          
2  Email From: Mabel van Oranje-Wisse Smit Sent: June 08, 2007. 
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Third, OSI advocates normative projects. For instance, EUmap is an advocacy 
program that works with national experts and nongovernmental organizations to 
encourage broader participation in the process of articulating the EU’s common 
democratic values as well as in ongoing monitoring of compliance with human rights 
standards throughout the union. Similarly, the OSI’s East-East Program is an 
exchange program to “develop advocacy networks for the transnational promotion of 
open society” (OSI, 2004: 156). It supports exchanges among actors from civil society 
in order, inter alia, to share best practices and lessons learned in social 
transformation.  Finally, OSI supports various research groups inside and outside its 
organizational domain as well as sponsoring scholarships. Although it is legally 
separate from OSI, the Central European University (CEU) is connected with OSI.  
 
As an organization, OSI is a policy transfer agent. Certainly, OSI is involved in the 
spread of best practices at a country and region wide level (interview 6). Key 
individuals such as Aryeh Neier, president of the OSI, have shaped OSI to give it a 
strong ‘human rights’ orientation.  Even so, the directors of programs and Initiatives 
have considerable autonomy in implementation and their engagement with policy 
communities as norm brokers.  
 
Access of OSI actors into international debates is conditioned by official recognition 
and public perceptions of legitimacy to participate.  The authority and legitimacy for 
non-state public action in global affairs is not naturally given but cultivated through 
various management practices and intellectual activities. The private authority of 
WEF or Freedom House or OSI rests in large degree with their establishment as non-
profit or charitable organizations. Their executives can argue on the one hand, they 
are not compromised by the need to generate profits in tailoring policy analysis to the 
needs of clients, and on the other hand, that they have independence or autonomy 
from bureaucracies and political leaders. Indeed, the Annual Reports of the Soros 
Foundations Network are littered with references to the ‘independence’ and 
‘autonomy’ of the national foundations (also Carothers, 1999: 273). Such portrayals 
coincide with the contestable idea of foundations being based in the ‘third sector’.  
 
Another strategy to enhance legitimacy is rhetorical resort to the professional and 
scientific norms of scholarly discovery and intellectual investigation (Lera St Clair, 
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2005). Universities have long held this status.  CEU is no exception.  Think tanks set 
themselves apart from other non-state actors as independent knowledge organizations, 
and often cultivate a reified image as public-minded civil society organizations 
untainted by connection to vested interest or political power. Mixed sources of 
funding reinforce this discourse of dispassionate expertise and critical distance.  
  
A related discursive tactic is when non-state actors adopt the mantle of protectors of 
the principles and philosophies underlying democratic societies. Not only OSI, but 
numerous bodies lay claim to participation in public debate by ‘representing’ the 
interests of minorities or the human rights of oppressed communities and future 
generations.   
 
The ends of both the donor and the grantee organization are served. Such discourses 
of authority and legitimacy are a necessary component in effectively diffusing ideas 
and propelling them into official domains. Via these three discourses of conduct – 
non-profit legal and financial independence; dispassionate scientific endeavour; and 
democratic representation – credibility is manufactured for non state actors. But in 
creating their credibility, they become ‘harnessed to the task of governing’ (Sending 
& Neumann, 2006: 656). Or as another observer has stated, ‘the concept of global 
civil society should be understood in terms of its rhetorical function…’ (Bartelson, 
2006: 372).  
 
Civil society dialogues with governments and international organizations have 
become more frequent where such groups are treated as ‘partners’ and ‘stakeholders’ 
in international development.  It is within this context that the Open Society Institute 
can be found. Like most private philanthropic enterprises, the OSI is legally 
independent. However, various units of the OSI are to be found in partnership with 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank or parts of the 
European Commission. As OSI expands its “global agenda, partnerships with other 
donors are becoming ever more significant” (OSI, 2006: 174). Many more 
organizations that are recipients of OSI grants are likewise enmeshed in regional 
policy dialogues, international alliances or multilateral initiatives. With their 
substantial financial resources, foundations are in a prime position for promoting 
norms and setting agendas for policy debate.  
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For some, private philanthropy is a privileged strategy for generating new forms of 
“policy knowledge” convergent with the interests of their promoters (Guilhot, 2007).  
This is apposite when assessing the OSI and its sister institution CEU regarding the 
political and ideological functions of philanthropic initiatives in higher education.   
… it gives us indications regarding the strategic value of these fields as 
laboratories of social reform – both as the training ground of new elites 
and as generators of policy knowledge. Investing in higher education 
does not only earn philanthropists some social prestige: it allows them to 
promote “scientific” ideas about social reform and to define the 
legitimate entitlements to exercise power by reorganizing traditional 
curricula and disciplines. Educational philanthropy allows specific social 
groups, using their economic and social capital, to shape the policy arena 
not so much by imposing specific policies as by crafting and imposing 
the tools of policy-making (Guilhot, 2007: 449).  
CEU represents the transfer of Western educational values and systems. The OSI is a 
vehicle for the transfer of a wider range of policy ideas and practices.  
 
3. Transferring Open Societies   
 
OSI is engaged in normative transfers.  Indeed, the OSI motto – “Building a Global 
Alliance for Open Society” – is indicative of the organization function of brokering 
norms.   
 
Yet, ‘soft’ ideational modes of persuasion – such as reflected in accusations from 
politicians that OSI actors played a catalytic behind-the-scenes role in the Rose and 
Orange Revolutions of Georgia and Ukraine – suggest that norms and policy activity 
promoting them can have counter-hegemonic impact. Russian President Vladimir 
Putin accused George Soros of orchestrating the ‘color revolutions’. The contagion 
potential of “powerful pro-democracy groups in neighboring countries apparently 
represent a very effective power resource for would-be democratizers” (Gray, 2006).3
                                                          
3  Most interviewees distanced the OSI from such interpretations, considering journalistic 
portrayals to be over-simplification of the role that OSI played and a gross over statement of 
  
 12 
OSI funds and diffuses opposition ideas, alternative experts and ‘open society’ norms.  
Yet, ‘open society’ principles as have had mixed reception within target countries and 
communities. National foundations have faced real difficulties in Belarus, Uzbekistan 
and Tajikistan due to the oppressiveness of the incumbent regimes towards OSI and 
other non-state actors.  
 
The OSI operates as a norm broker for ‘open society’ values. That is, it generates, 
disseminates norms concerning “rule of law; respect for human rights, minorities, and 
minority opinion; democratically elected governments; market economies in which 
business and government are separate; and thriving civil societies” (OSI, 2003: 187). 
OSI engages in policy transfer primarily as a generator and disseminator of ideas and 
people via network wide initiatives, and less so as an implementer.  The national 
foundations have been more closely involved in implementation. And these 
foundations can be seen as both norm brokers and exercising choice as ‘norm takers’. 
That is, “local agents reconstruct foreign norms to ensure that norms fit with the 
agents cognitive priors and identities” in a dynamic process of ‘localization’.  Norm 
takers “build congruence between transnational norms … and local beliefs and 
practices” (Acharya, 2004: 239-241). Or what Joe Stiglitz paraphrased as “scan 
globally, reinvent locally (2005). 
 
For instance, an early program developed out of New York, and now managed from 
London, is the ‘East-East: Partnership Beyond Borders’ program.  After 1989 with the 
onslaught of East-West exchanges, Soros wanted to provide opportunities for an 
‘East-East’ “communications space”. A remarkably low-cost program, it was 
designed to educate people into the idea that there could be more to learn from each 
other rather than going to the West where inappropriate models, different historical 
and economic circumstances and mismatch of experience could occur. East-East has 
been “de-mystifying” who you can learn from and where lessons lie.  Rather than 
displacing East-West exchanges, the East-East program is “additional or 
supplemental” (interview 1.).  
                                                                                                                                                                      
its influence. “We are not the driving force behind oppositions in Ukraine or Georgia … they 
would be there anyway” (interview 3).   
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East-East is rooted in the national foundations. The program works because it is 
“bottom-up” where the London-based director relies upon people in the national 
foundations “who have the pulse” to deliver ideas and plans on what kinds of 
exchanges are needed. “The national foundations fill in the content”.  The local 
autonomy bestowed on national foundations is designed to promote the most 
favorable environment for learning and ‘local ownership’ of policy ideas (Carothers, 
1996). 
 
East-East also serves as a mechanism to link the national foundations to prevent them 
working in isolation (interview 1.).  A clear example of policy transfer, one initiative 
was “to help European Union actual and prospective candidate countries learn from 
the experiences of Central European countries that succeeded in acquiring EU 
membership” (OSI, 2006: 138). But whether such exchanges promote policy learning, 
or merely the dissemination of information and techniques, remains a moot point.  
 
The ‘soft’ transfer of ideas and information is relatively easy.  It is a more difficult 
enterprise first to see knowledge about ‘best practice’ structure official thinking or 
public discourse and secondly, to ensure that policy knowledge becomes 
institutionalized. Notwithstanding considerable degree of information sharing, policy 
research and expert advice disseminated between the OSI head offices and the various 
national foundations, the causal nexus between transferred policy ideas and their 
adoption is muddied by many intervening variables.  
 
Whilst the causal impact of policy ideas upon individual and group behaviour is 
invariably a muddy one in methodological terms, it is nevertheless the case that 
through the OSI network, non-state actors share discourses and help construct the 
consensual knowledge that defines an international policy community. For instance, 
on the advocacy front, OSI was a donor to the Campaign to Ban Landmines. It has 
also partnered with multilateral initiatives such as the Consultative Group to Assist 
the Poorest, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.  Among 
scientific communities, OSI has long supported research in the public health field 
such as the international effort on extremely drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB).   
The OSI network also enables actors to operate beyond their domestic context and 
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empowers some OSI funded experts to project their ideas into policy thinking across 
states and within issue specific global or regional forums.  
 
A matter for discussion in interviews concerned tendencies to “universalization” 
within OSI. That is, the assumption that there is commonness of the Central and 
Eastern European experience (a homogenization of the different country and local 
experiences) and a policy belief in the replication of the experience in other venues. 
That is, what was done in CEE can be transmitted into Central Asia.  Such a 
development in thinking loses what was innovative and special in the encouragement 
of “local knowledge” and “local ability” via the national foundations during the 
1990s.  The bureaucratization of OSI as the organization consolidates has prompted a 
universalizing dynamic that it is in tension with the ‘reflexive’ spirit favored by 
Soros.4
 
 It presents a challenge for OSI management given limited resources resulting 
the networks growing geographical spread, and where staff expertise is founded on 
transition experiences in the CEE and FSU that prompts a default to “second world 
lessons for third world contexts …  We need to avoid this” (interview 7).   
As the national foundations are encouraged to become more autonomous and 
financially independent of OSI, a subtle transformation is occurring.  OSI gradually 
moves away from its ‘bottom-up’ strong contextual approach to capacity building of 
local and national communities towards a ‘top down’ professionalized dynamic of 
policy interaction with decision makers. That is, “more like a traditional foundation 
with program officers in New York” (interview 5).  In short, OSI is moving away 
from public action that is focused on capacity building at local and national levels 
(built in the historical context of post-communist transitions) to activity aimed at 
transnational levels and at higher level policy processes. “The losers are the 
traditional national foundations” (interview 7).  This centrifugal dynamic has created 
a more vertical set of relationships within OSI and with its grantee organizations.  
                                                          
4  John Gray (2006) paraphrased Soros’ position on ‘reflexivity’ as follows: “social objects 
are partly created by human perceptions and beliefs, and when these perceptions and beliefs 
change, social objects change with them. This introduces an element of uncertainty into our 
view of the world: … we can never have objective knowledge of society”.  
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4. OSI Policy Expertise 
 
OSI has played a prominent role in the region “promoting policy research, evaluating 
policy options, initiating and disseminating best practices, and monitoring 
policies…”. As the “Communist menace” receded in the early 1990s, it “pursued 
individual grant making for scholarly research, academic advancement of the local 
expert communities, and enhancing diversified civil societies and independent media” 
(Krizsán and Zentai, 2005: 169-70).  
 
The Local Government and Public Sector Initiative (LGI) and PASOS are good 
examples of the OSI as a generator and disseminator of policy ideas. PASOS is the 
Policy Association for an Open Society – a network of policy institutes from 23 CEE 
countries and the Newly Independent States. It provides institutional infrastructure for 
pooling and exchanging policy-related knowledge. PASOS was established by LGI, 
an older OSI initiative to promote democratic and effective governance in the 
countries of the Soros Foundations Network. LGI has specialized in financial 
management reforms.  
 
An important component of PASOS activity is to improve the capacity of the 
participating centers through exchange and sharing of best practices in a collaborative 
manner. LGI has targeted both managerial capacity of the centers and their capacity to 
prepare better policy documents and advocacy (through training workshops and 
mentorship). Considerable attention is dedicated to twinning centers and sharing of 
good practices.  One area where policy transfer has already been facilitated by LGI as 
a ‘knowledge broker’ concerns the spread and adoption of ‘quarterly economic 
indicators’ in Ukraine, Moldova and Kazakhstan in national accounting systems 
(Ionescu et al, 2005).   
 
One PASOS member is the Center for Policy Studies (CPS), an academic unit at 
CEU. CPS conducts “research and advocacy” on public integrity and anti-corruption; 
social diversity and equal opportunities; and rural development. These are project 
areas where there is some impetus and aspiration for the diffusion of policy ideas and 
their inculcation in emerging policy elites through training programs. For instance, the 
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Public Integrity Education Network managed by CPS and part funded by OSI) is a 
network of universities and civil service colleges in 60 countries engaged in the 
development of new courses and resources in the field of governance, integrity and 
administrative reform.  
 
CPS incubated a Masters of Public Policy that eventually spawned an independent 
Department of Public Policy at CEU.  In tune with the wider objectives of the 
University, it is aimed at training professionals to become sensitive to global 
governance (Guilhot, 2007).  CPS also manages OSI’s International Policy 
Fellowship initiative (Pop, 2006). The motivation for this program is largely to 
counter ‘brain drain’ by giving in-country fellowships to researchers and activists who 
have potential as open society leaders.  ‘Soft’ modes of policy transfer occur through 
the mentoring process of fellows who gain professional advice on how to write policy 
documents, spark public discourse in transition countries, and propel their ideas into 
official domains (OSI, 2003: 159).  
 
The transfer undertaken is of western standards of policy professionalism.  One of the 
most widely utilized resources of LGI has been Writing Effective Policy Papers 
(Quinn & Young, 2002). The book adapts Anglo-American ideas of policy writing for 
post-transition regional audiences adapting to new policy environments. Its authors 
are regular participants in various capacity building workshops organized by OSI and 
other multilateral donors in the region to transfer professional experience and 
technical advice about public policy processes.    
 
Notwithstanding historical and individual ties between OSI and various parts of the 
University, the relationship between the two is increasingly marked by different 
trajectories.  Like many universities, disciplinary boundaries are hardening in that 
scholars stick to their departments and research interests. Employment contracts no 
longer require CEU staff to devote 20 days work to OSI.  The pursuit of academic 
norms has implications in providing little incentive for faculty to engage with OSI.   
 
5. The ‘Global Turn’ and the ‘Policy Awakening’ 
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From the end of the 1990s, the Network engaged in various debates regarding global 
transformations and as a consequence, ventured to reach out to new regions of the 
world (Palley, 2002). The programs of the Network sought to critically examine 
issues of emerging democracies not only in a post-socialist but in a global context 
(Krizsán and Zentai, 2005).  As Soros become interested in globalization, he was less 
inclined to close down OSI as originally intended (interview 2).  
The ‘global’ strategy was also pushed by the accession of the new 10 member states 
to the EU. This ‘global turn’ is perceived by interviewees 1. and 3. as a horizontal 
stretch of OSI activity across national geographies rather than a vertical conceptual 
expansion of influencing global debates and international organization. This view can 
be contrasted to that of George Soros who stated: “Our global open society lacks the 
institutions and mechanisms necessary for its preservation, but there is no political 
will to bring them into existence” (Soros, 1997: 7).  One event to mark the re-
fashioned goals of the OSI was CEU’s 10th Anniversary Conference in 2001. For 
CEU and its sister institution OSI, the conference was a venue to publicize their joint 
commitment to the ‘global open society’ and the objective “to articulate critical and 
policy views in the global public sphere” (Krizsán and Zentai, 2003: 37, 35).  An 
objective has been to get the “network programs to think global, to spread expertise” 
(interview 7).  
 
Through the mechanism of the Chairman’s and Presidential Grants, there are further 
signs of the global agenda. Grant giving to transnational advocacy programs 
(interview 7) is especially apparent in the fields of human rights and anti-corruption.  
In 2003, funding went to bodies such as Global Witness, the Data Foundation (for 
educating the US public about debt relief, aid and trade), TIRI (formerly known as 
Transparency International Research Institute), and long standing OSI partners such 
as Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis Group (OSI, 2003: 190).   
 
Another indicator of the ‘global turn’ is the degree of interaction and partnership 
between OSI and international organizations such as the World Bank, the European 
Union, and the WHO as well as a range of other non-state international actors (OSI, 
2006: 174).  OSI has a Memorandum of Understanding with UNDP. There is the long 
standing record of work of OSI regarding Roma communities, support for the 
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establishment of the European Roma Rights Center and the regional Roma 
Participation Program. Much work involved surveys and data gathering simply to 
understand the dimensions of the situation faced by Roma. In mid 2003, the OSI in 
conjunction with the World Bank initiated the ‘Decade of Roma Inclusion: 2005—
2015’. The two institutions have subsequently brought to the partnership most 
regional governments as well as that of Finland and Sweden, the European 
Commission, UNDP and the Council of Europe (Krizsán and Zentai, 2005: 175-80). 
Others in OSI also see the Roma Decade as a success albeit more as a “rhetorical 
device” (interview 3) and an “empty frame” to fill (interview 5).  Even though Roma 
concerns are advocated in regional or global institutions, a change in attitudes and 
practice in local communities and national administrations has been considerably 
slower.  
 
As such, the ‘global turn’ has many dimensions.  It includes the internationalization of 
civil society at national and sub-national levels through capacity building initiatives to 
educate local communities and policy actors into the impact of globalization and 
regionalization. Additionally, OSI partners with international organizations and 
governments in arrangements described as ‘global public policy networks’ (OSI, 
2006: 174; Stone, 2008). The global turn is also apparent in the re-articulation of the 
Network’s driving principles for a ‘global open society’.    
 
However, the global turn is not an evenly spread dynamic throughout OSI.  Few of 
the national foundations work on regional issues, or on international organizations, or 
even on other countries.  “Most work on public policy”; that is, advocacy, capacity 
building and research at the national level (interview 4). Instead, the ‘global turn’ is 
more pronounced in OSI initiatives directed from New York or Budapest, and 
increasingly the London office. 
 
Related to the ‘global turn’ is its ‘policy awakening’.  As OSI has matured, it has 
advanced from a focus on capacity building to using built capacity to influence policy.   
For instance, as stated by the former LGI Research director: 
We… have started to gradually move towards new forms of 
international development. Beyond traditional action-oriented, grant-
giving and capacity-building activities, we are actively involved in 
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policy design and policy-making (Gabor Peteri, preface to Quinn & 
Young, 2002).  
Institution building and open society advocacy has not been supplanted. However, 
recognition that “the collapse of a repressive regime does not automatically lead to the 
establishment of an open society” (Soros, 1997: 10-11) prompted more nuanced, 
targeted and policy focused approach in the Network. Indicative of the policy 
awakening is the support given to PASOS and other think tanks like the ECFR as well 
as the International Policy Fellowships.  
 
This ‘policy turn’ has been by design, but was also an economic necessity:  
Grant making in 1990s style is no longer feasible. The US dollar was 
stronger and went a long way. We have expanded our reach, so 
foundations have become smaller in real dollar terms (interview 3.); 
 
The global and policy turn happened simultaneously. We had focused on 
generalized civil society development but resources were starting to 
decrease. We concentrate on policy change now rather than a thousand 
flowers blooming (interview 7.) 
The focus on policy work is succeeding civil society capacity building, and represents 
a more self conscious approach in OSI. At the same time, there is an “on-going 
internal discussion” about the crisis of sustainability for many civil society 
organizations in CEE (interview 5; Koncz, 2006).  
 
OSI combines activities with normative aspirations and advocacy alongside scientific 
pursuits and scholarly analysis.  To this extent, the Network has “functioned as a 
mechanism of bridging knowledge production and policy…” (Krizsán and Zentai, 
2005: 169). The organization is sufficiently broad and flexible (some say 
‘fragmented’) to encompass a variety of differently motivated actions. While there are 
contradictions or tensions inherent in such combinations of norm advocacy and 
knowledge generation, there are also potential benefits in consolidating the mission of 
the OSI. The network structure potentially facilitates the incorporation of local 
expertise into more traditional and elite research approaches. Parts of the Network can 
be engaged in policy from conceptualization through to policy advocacy, concrete 
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action and monitoring, although this does not happen as often as hoped (Krizsán and 
Zentai, 2005: 174, 182).  
 
Its image as a knowledge actor is a significant source of authority for OSI.  Many of 
its operatives have social status as experts and reputable policy analysts.  Many OSI 
operations are think tanks or other types of research and analysis organization. 
Attributed as public-spirited and with a steadfast commitment to independence, 
objectivity and scholarly enterprise bestows authority on OSI in a dynamic that also 
boosts the reputations of the individuals associated with it.  These groups (and 
sometimes the media in its quest for expert commentary) legitimate OSI staff as 
‘serious’ and ‘expert’ persons. To maintain their organizational reputation and 
repudiate accusations of politicization, lobbying, or ideological polemic, OSI 
executives have encouraged engagement with academic communities. In this regard, 
the relationship and physical proximity of OSI-Budapest to its sister institution, the 
Central European University is important.  
 
In sum, the OSI has been in constant renegotiation and reconstruction of its identity 
and in pushing out its socio-political boundaries as a transnational actor. In re-
inventing itself from a norm broker in opposition to communism and advocating open 
society values to become a body with stronger research capacity, it has also sought to 
bridge social science and praxis. Finally, although it is a non-state actor, its 
partnership activities and policy aspirations implicate OSI in transnational policy 
making.   
 
6. Transnational Policy Networks 
 
The source of OSI power and influence does not lie in numbers; it does not have or 
seek electoral support, and it is not a social movement. Nor does it have the power 
and authority of public office; it is outside the international civil service of 
intergovernmental organizations and state bureaucracies.  In terms of material power, 
OSI is puny compared to that of corporations and the economic clout of business, 
notwithstanding the hundreds of millions ploughed in by its founder. Instead, the 
sources of its power in policy lie in the appeal of its norms, knowledge and networks. 
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That is, the norms of the open society and human rights bolstered by knowledge 
creation through think tanks, university and policy fellowships.  
 
OSI seeks to provide the conceptual language, the normative paradigms, the empirical 
examples that then become the accepted assumptions for those making policy.  OSI 
does not act alone in such intellectual action, but frequently in coalition with like-
minded thinkers and activists in journalism, the professions, universities and so forth. 
Through its networks, OSI draws together intellectual resources allowing the national 
foundations to do the work of articulation between the national, regional and global 
levels of governance. The very notion of ‘open society’ has also been represented by 
Soros as “as a universal concept (that) transcends all boundaries” (Soros, 1997: 7).  
That is, a concept and value system that can be transferred.  
 
However, rather than just transcending boundaries, the OSI – and numerous other 
transnational actors – are also carving out new transnational spaces for public action. 
The Habermasian notion of a public sphere goes some way to accommodating this 
idea of a realm for the evolution of public opinion (Hodess, 2001: 130). However, this 
notion is based predominantly on debate and dialogue, neglecting in considerable 
degree the variety of institutional developments that populate this space and the global 
policy processes that networks form. Instead of a simple co-option into governance, 
OSI is proactive in the creation transnational policy transfer processes through its own 
international network infrastructure and identity, as well as through multiple policy 
partnerships.   
 
Within this sphere of global policy debate and networking, OSI has been 
consolidating its own credibility and authority in part by creating its own audiences 
and reference points. Funding intellectuals, NGOs, the CEU and other academic 
centers helps build clientele relationships between these grantees and OSI, as well as 
with other foreign donors.  By no means is this exceptional to OSI, but a common 
feature of philanthropic foundations (Roelofs, 2003: 188). However, OSI subsidizes 
various experts and intellectuals to inform professional or bureaucratic audiences.  
Instead of the linear transmission of knowledge with OSI as a one-way conveyer belt 
of policy ideas, a circular process is in operation whereby the constituencies of OSI 
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are sources of legitimation of OSI as a “transnational expert institution” (Lera St 
Clair, 2005).  
 
Recognition of OSI supported think tanks as centers for expert, scientific and 
authoritative advice occurs because of the scholarly credentials and output of these 
organizations. It transpires because of the relationship with public institutions and 
donor groups that have a vested interest in the general belief that policy institutes and 
are rational social tools for policy planning. Commissioning and funding studies, 
these interests want independent and rigorous analysis. On the other side of the coin, 
these international agencies can then legitimize their policy position by arguing that 
they are interacting with and consulting independent civil society organizations. The 
various policy networks of the national foundations further embed OSI in a range of 
official actions and public policies.  Clear distinctions between state and non-state, 
public and private, actors become blurred.    Moreover, hierarchies in civil society are 
generated. 
 
OSI becomes a ‘meta-NGO’ where its primary purpose is to provide support to other 
NGOs and groups but can “end up ‘governing’ other NGOS” (Stubbs, 2005: 81).  And 
in taking a ‘global turn’ in its ‘policy awakening’ OSI-NY and Budapest become 
more distant from local associations and closer to international organizations and 
other ‘transnational expert institutions’.   
 
To conclude, this paper avoids assumptions that non-state actors are in distinct 
domain of civil society separate from emergent forms of transnational authority. Nor 
does it regard philanthropic foundations as located in a hermetically sealed ‘third 
sector’ separate from state or market.  Focusing on the ‘soft’ ideational and normative 
policy transfer undermines notions of clear cut boundaries between an independent 
philanthropic body in civil society and highlights the intermeshing and mutual 
engagement that comes with networks and coalitions, funding, partnerships and 
shared policy dialogues.   While OSI has origins as a grass roots civil society actor in 
the post communist countries, it is becoming an elite global policy organization 
engaged with the rather more closed societies of multilateral initiative and 
transnational policy networks.   
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